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Abstract 
We find that perceptions of crime and individual experience with crime (crime 
victimization) are positively correlated with left-wing beliefs within countries, controlling 
for income and other correlates of ideology, in a sample for Latin American countries in 
the mid-1990’s. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists have increasingly argued that capitalist forms of organization outperform socialism. In 
practice, however, capitalist ideas appear to be doing very badly with the general public in certain 
regions of the world. Socialist ideas are more prevalent in the names and platforms of parties in low 
income countries (see Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002). Resistance to free markets has been observed 
in former communist countries in Eastern Europe, underdeveloped countries in Africa and even 
modern democracies in Europe. In Latin America this phenomenon is especially acute. After a decade 
of privatizations and de-regulation, a political backlash against markets has been observed in almost all 
of the countries in the region. Stokes (2001) and Lora and Olivera (2005) document the electoral costs 
of adopting pro-market reforms in Latin America. The question is why this has happened.  
 
A natural explanation to most economists is that market forces make the income distribution less 
equal, leading the median voter to demand higher income taxes (as in a standard Meltzer and Richard 
model, 1981). A problem with this explanation is that it fails to explain even the most basic patterns 
across countries. The pre-tax distribution of income in the US, for example, is more unequal than that 
in Europe. Yet, Americans want to, and actually do, redistribute less than the Europeans. Alesina, 
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) present the data for OECD countries and stress the role of beliefs. They 
report that 60% of Americans, yet only 26% of Europeans, believe the poor are lazy, and also show 
that such beliefs are strong predictors of government intervention across countries.1 However we still 
have little idea of what causes differences in beliefs. A natural hypothesis is that they simply reflect the 
different experiences that individuals have. Piketty (1995) is a seminal paper with these features where 
two identical economies evolve along different paths due to differences in initial shocks. Other papers 
explore the role of fairness (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), corruption (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 
2002) and also the incentives for people to engage in belief manipulation (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). 
Evidence on the structure of beliefs includes Hochschild (1981), Inglehart (1990), Ladd and Bowman 
(1998), Corneo and Gruner (2002), Fong (2001, 2004) and Di Tella, Schargrodsky and Galiani, (2007), 
inter alia. 
 
                                        
1 Denzau and North (1993), Greif (1994) and North (2005) link beliefs to institutions: “There is an intimate relationship between 
belief systems and the institutional framework. Belief systems embody the internal representation of the human landscape. Institutions are the 
structure that humans impose on that landscape in order to produce the desired outcomes. Belief systems therefore are the internal representation 
and institutions the external manifestation of that representation” (North, 2005, pp. 77 and 119) 
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In this paper we study the connection between crime and beliefs. A natural place to start is political 
ideology: social conservatives are preoccupied with maintaining law and order, typically supporting 
being “tough on crime”. In the economic domain, however, the connection may go in a different 
direction. Consider a property crime after which the victim (criminal) has less (more) money. The 
distribution of income is less fair, unless one believes that the criminal is more deserving than the 
victim. Theoretically at least, an increase in crime could move beliefs in a left-wing direction. Of 
course, higher crime is going to raise the demand for punishment and may give salience to social 
conservatives. But from the point of view of economic beliefs, it is hard to avoid the perception that 
the distribution of income in society is less fair. Likewise, when crime is high it is harder to believe 
that poverty is caused by laziness rather than bad luck, as the latter may include crime victimization. If 
true, this raises the intriguing possibility that reform fatigue in Latin America is caused by the 
observed increase in crime during the 1990’s. We study economic beliefs and observe their correlation 
with individual perceptions and experience of crime in this region and during this period. Section II 
describes the data and empirical strategy. Results are reported in section III and section IV concludes. 
 
II. DATA and EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
Our main data source is the Latinobarometer, an annual public opinion survey of approximately 
19,000 interviews in 18 countries in Latin America for the years 1994-2005. It includes several 
questions on attitudes and beliefs explicitly designed to capture anti-market sentiment. These include 
one on the fairness of the distribution of income (Fair-L), one on the benefits of privatization 
(Privatize-L) and one on the benefits of state intervention (State-L). The -L extension on these variables 
indicates that higher values are the answer most naturally associated with a left-wing ideological 
position. For example, Fair-L  is a dummy equal to 1 if the answer to the question: “Now I'd like you to 
answer some questions about the problem of poverty, in this country and in other countries: How fair do you think the 
distribution of income is in this country?” is “Very unfair” and equal to 0 if the answer is “Very fair”, “Fair”, 
“Neither fair nor unfair” or “Unfair”. We repeated the analysis using each of the five categories and the 
results remain similar. The appendix has a complete data description.  
 
We also have data on the respondent’s perception of the changes in the crime level (Perception of Crime) 
and victimization experience (Real Crime). With respect to Perception of Crime, the raw data show that 
96,358 individuals selected the answer “crime has increased a lot over the past year”, a total of 14,610 say “it 
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has increased somewhat”, 8,591 say “it has stayed the same”, 2,904 say “it has dropped somewhat” while 439 say 
“it has dropped a lot”. Thus, we collapsed the answers into two, with the first category being “increased a 
lot” and the second being all the remaining categories. We again repeated the analysis using each of the 
five categories and the results remain similar. 
 
The following probit regressions are estimated across 17 Latin American nations from 1995 to 2004: 
 
Economic Belief-L ict    =    δ Crime ict   +   Personal Controlsict   +   η c   +   µ t   +    ε ict       
 
where Economic Belief-L refers to either Fair-L, Privatize-L or State-L and Crime refers to either Perception 
of Crime or Real Crime. The beliefs refer to the survey responses of individual, i, living in country, c, in 
year, t. Personal Controlsict is a set of personal characteristics including the age, gender, marital status and 
income of each respondent. Dummies for cross-sectional (country) units, ηc, and for years, µt, are 
included. Finally, εict is the (i.i.d) error term.  
 
III. RESULTS 
 
Column (1) in Table A explains each individual’s perception of the fairness of the income distribution 
(Fair-L) by their perception of the rise in crime (Perception of Crime). We include a basic set of controls 
(Personal Controls I), namely age, gender, marital status and Income I in this base regression. The more an 
individual perceives crime to have risen, the more likely they are to think that the income distribution 
is unfair. Since the proportion of people that perceived crime to have risen went up from 64.8% in 
1995 to 80.3% in 2002, under a causal interpretation these estimates suggest that the proportion of 
people reporting a ‘Very unfair’ distribution of income should have increased by 1.7 percentage points 
(=(0.803-0.648)*0.107). As the proportion of the population that perceived the distribution of income 
to be ‘Very unfair’ rose from 27.9% in 1995 to 40.9% in 2002, the increase in the perception of crime 
explains 13.1% of the increase in the ‘unfair’ distribution sentiment (=1.7/(40.9-27.9)). 
 
Column (2) presents the same specification but using Privatize-L as the dependent variable. The 
proportion of the population who perceived privatizations to have not ‘been beneficial’ to their country 
rose from 48.6% in 1995 to 75.3% in 2004. Those individuals who perceive crime to have increased 
also tend to disagree that privatization of public companies has been beneficial. In other words, those 
who perceive crime to have risen also state the more left-wing position. As in the previous regression 
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the effect is significant at the 1% level, although its size is smaller. In column (3) the dependent 
variable is State-L and its coefficient is insignificant.  
 
Columns (4-6) present a similar set of regressions, but we increase the basic set of controls (Personal 
Controls II). Besides Personal Controls I, these regressions add Income II, city size, education, occupation and 
ideology. Similar results obtain. This is a partial answer to the objection that the results may be picking 
up the fact that left-wing people are of a particular type who happen also to perceive bigger increases 
in crime. For example, it could be that left-wingers happen to be poor and the poor live in areas that 
experience higher crime increases.  
 
A second way to provide a sense of the robustness of the results is to use victimization data. The 
survey asks whether the respondent or a member of his or her immediate family was a victim of crime 
in the last year. The proportion of victimized respondents rose from 29.8% in 1995 to 35.1% in 2004. 
In Table B both Fair-L and Privatize-L again show a significant positive association with being a victim 
of crime, even when all the co-variates are included (Personal Controls II). When State-L is used as the 
dependent variable, the correlation is weakly positive. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We investigate the relationship between crime and economic ideology. Given the large increase in 
crime in Latin America during the 1990’s, our conjecture is that this force may be behind the observed 
backlash against pro-market reforms in the region. Using recent data from the Latinobarómetro 
Surveys, we find that people who believe that crime has increased also report a lower intensity of pro-
market beliefs. For example, they tend to believe that the distribution of income is unfair, or they 
disagree with the idea that privatizations have been good for the country. The correlation survives the 
inclusion of two different sets of controls for individual income (one self-reported and the other 
constructed by the interviewer), controls for age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, 
ideology, (country-specific) city size dummies and country and year fixed effects. We also find that 
beliefs are correlated with a person’s victimization experience in the expected direction (i.e., victims 
report more anti-market beliefs).  
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Table A 
Perceptions of crime on left wing beliefs on 17 Latin America Nations: 1995-2002 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Fair-L Privatize-L State-L Fair-L Privatize-L State-L 
       
Perception of Crime 0.107 0.052 -0.005 0.085 0.050 -0.008 
 (18.79) (9.47) (0.51) (10.80) (8.04) (0.80) 
       
Personal Controls I Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Personal Controls II No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0511 0.0348 0.0247 0.0595 0.0435 0.0299 
No. of Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 
No. of Years 4 5 3 3 5 3 
No of Observations 47,283 53,107 22,364 27,209 41,304 17,642 
 
 
 
 
Table B 
Real crime on left wing beliefs on 17 Latin America Nations: 1995-2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Fair-L Privatize-L State-L Fair-L Privatize-L State-L 
       
Real Crime 0.037 0.011 0.005 0.029 0.007 0.008 
 (8.13) (2.85) (0.78) (4.77) (1.64) (1.02) 
       
Personal Controls I Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Personal Controls II No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0461 0.0357 0.0249 0.0568 0.0408 0.0301 
No. of Countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 
No. of Years 4 6 3 3 6 3 
No of Observations 47,231 68,738 22,315 27,120 52,387 17,604 
 
 
Notes: [1] Name of dependent variable has -L extension if higher numbers mean more left-wing beliefs. All variable 
definitions are in the appendix. [3] The regressions are probits that include year and country dummies. Marginal effects are 
reported. Absolute value of z-statistics are in parentheses. Source: Latinobarómetro.  
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Appendix 
 
The Latinobarómetro Survey is an annual public opinion survey of approximately 19,000 interviews in 18 
countries in Latin America. Questions of interest rotate. It is produced by Latinobarómetro Corporation, a 
non-profit NGO based in Santiago, Chile. The surveys are carried out through face-to-face interviews, with a 
sampling universe consisting of adults, aged 18 and older. The countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and Spain. 
 
Fair-L:  A dummy equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Now I'd like you to answer some questions about the 
problem of poverty, in this country and in other countries: How fair do you think the distribution of income is in this 
country?” is “Very fair”, “Fair”, “Neither fair nor unfair” or “Unfair” and 1 if the answer is “Very unfair”. 
 
 Privatize-L: A dummy equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
The Privatization of public companies has been beneficial to the country” is “I agree” and 1 if it is “I disagree”. 
 
State-L: A dummy equal to 0 is the answer to the question: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The 
State should leave production to the private sector” is “I agree” and 1 if it is “I disagree”. 
 
Perception of Crime: A dummy equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Crime has increased or decreased?” is either 
“Has increased a little”, “Has stayed the same”, “Has fallen a little” or “Has fallen a lot” and 1 if it is “Has 
increased a lot”. 
 
Real Crime: A dummy equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Have you or a relative of yours been a victim of an 
assault, an aggression, or a crime, in the last 12 months?” is ‘No’ and 1 if it is ‘Yes’. 
 
Age: Respondent’s age in years.  
 
Gender: A dummy equal to 0 if the respondent is female and 1 if the respondent is male. 
 
Marital Status: A set of dummy variables corresponding to the respondent’s marital status: married, single, 
separated, divorced or widowed. 
 
Income I: The respondent’s declared income, as identified by the question: “The wage or salary you receive and the total 
family income, Does it allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? In which of these situations are you?” The possible 
answers are “4. It is good enough, you can save”, “3. It is just enough, without great difficulties”, “2. It is not enough, 
you have difficulties” and “1. It is not enough, you have great difficulties”. 
 
Income II: Interviewer decides the level of each respondent’s socio-economic status, as identified by the 
instruction: “Evaluation of the respondent’s socio-economic level. Take as reference points: quality of house, quality of 
furniture and general appearance of respondent.” The possible answers are “5. Very good”, “4. Good”, “3. 
Regular”, “2. Bad” and “1. Very bad”.   
 
City Size: A dummy equal to 0 if the size of the city where the interview takes place is “100,000 or less people” and 
equal to 1 if it is “a capital or more than 100,000 people”. 
 
Education: A set of dummies corresponding to a respondent’s education level: illiterate, basic-incomplete, basic-
complete, secondary-middle-technical-incomplete, secondary-middle-technical-complete, superior-
incomplete and superior-complete.  
 
Occupation: A set of dummies corresponding to a respondent’s type of work, as identified by the question: “What 
type of work do you do?”. The possible answers are “Independent Professional (doctor, lawyer, accountant, 
architect)/Independent Business owner”, “Salaried employee, public sector”, “Salaried employee, private sector”, 
“Temporarily not working”, “Retired”, “Does not work or housewife”, “Student”.  
 
Ideology: The cardinal response to the question: “In politics, people often refer to left and to right. In a scale where 0 is left 
and 10 is right, where would you place yourself?”. The possible answers are “0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10”. 
 
 
 8 
REFERENCES 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Ed Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote (2001) “Why Doesn’t the US have a European Style Welfare 
State?”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 187-277. 
Alesina, Alberto and George-Marios Angeletos (2005) “Corruption, Inequality and Fairness”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 52:7 (Oct 2005). 
Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2006) “Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 121(2): 699-746. 
Corneo, Giacomo and Hans Gruner (2002) “Individual preferences for political redistribution”, Journal of Public 
Economics, Volume 83, Issue 1, pp 83-107 
Denzau, A. and Douglass North (1993) “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions”, Economic 
History Working Paper #9039003. 
Di Tella, Rafael and Robert MacCulloch (2002) “Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?”, Harvard 
Business School, mimeo. 
Di Tella, Rafael, Schargrodsky, Ernesto and Sebastian Galiani (2007) “The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence 
from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 122, no. 1 
(February), pp. 209-41. 
Fong, Christina (2001) “Social Preferences, Self Interest and the Demand for Redistribution”, Journal of Public 
Economics 82, 2001; 225-246. 
Fong, Christina (2004) “Which Beliefs Matter for Redistributive Politics? Target-specific versus general beliefs 
about the causes of income”, Carnegie Mellon University, mimeo. 
Greif, Avner (1994) “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection 
on Collectivist and Individualist Societies”, Journal of Political Economy, 102(5): 912-50. 
Hochschild, Jennifer (1981) What’s Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA. 
Ladd, Everett Carll and Karlyn Bowman (1998) Attitudes Towards Economic Inequality, AEI Press: Washington. 
Lora, Eduardo and Mauricio Olivera (2005) “The Electoral Consequences of the Washington Consensus”, 
forthcoming Economia. 
Meltzer, A. and S. Richard (1981) “A rational theory of the size of government”, Journal of Political Economy 
89(5): 914-927. 
North, Douglass (2005) Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New 
Jersey. 
Piketty, Thomas (1995) “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3): 551–
84. 
 
 
 
 
